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Hans Boserup, Dr.jur. 🇩🇰's avatar

Chris, this is an unusually clear and historically grounded analysis of the war.

Your central point — that Western policy has been shaped less by strategy than by successive misreadings of the conflict — strikes me as particularly important. As you note, allied decisions were repeatedly framed by the expectation that Ukraine would lose, by fears of Russian escalation, and by hopes that diplomacy might substitute for military reality.

What has been remarkable is that the war itself has steadily falsified these assumptions.

Ukraine did not collapse in 2022. Russia did not resort to nuclear escalation when Western weapons systems were introduced. And “waiting for peace” has not produced peace.

In other words, the battlefield has repeatedly corrected the political narrative.

Seen from a longer historical perspective, this may explain why the war feels so difficult for Western governments to interpret. For three decades Europe has lived inside a post-Cold-War mental framework in which large-scale interstate wars of conquest were considered almost impossible. Yet Russia’s war against Ukraine is precisely that: a classical imperial war of domination, justified by historical myths about national unity and territorial destiny.

When political frameworks lag behind strategic reality, policy tends to become reactive and hesitant.

Ukraine’s resistance has therefore had two simultaneous effects: it has blocked Russia’s attempt to destroy Ukrainian statehood, but it has also forced the West to confront the return of geopolitical realities many believed had disappeared after 1991.

In that sense, Ukraine is not only fighting for its independence. It is forcing Europe and North America to rediscover the political will that underpins the idea of sovereignty itself.

The question now is whether Western policy will finally align with the logic of the war — or continue to trail behind events.

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