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Hans Boserup, Dr.jur. 🇩🇰's avatar

Chris, this is an unusually clear and historically grounded analysis of the war.

Your central point — that Western policy has been shaped less by strategy than by successive misreadings of the conflict — strikes me as particularly important. As you note, allied decisions were repeatedly framed by the expectation that Ukraine would lose, by fears of Russian escalation, and by hopes that diplomacy might substitute for military reality.

What has been remarkable is that the war itself has steadily falsified these assumptions.

Ukraine did not collapse in 2022. Russia did not resort to nuclear escalation when Western weapons systems were introduced. And “waiting for peace” has not produced peace.

In other words, the battlefield has repeatedly corrected the political narrative.

Seen from a longer historical perspective, this may explain why the war feels so difficult for Western governments to interpret. For three decades Europe has lived inside a post-Cold-War mental framework in which large-scale interstate wars of conquest were considered almost impossible. Yet Russia’s war against Ukraine is precisely that: a classical imperial war of domination, justified by historical myths about national unity and territorial destiny.

When political frameworks lag behind strategic reality, policy tends to become reactive and hesitant.

Ukraine’s resistance has therefore had two simultaneous effects: it has blocked Russia’s attempt to destroy Ukrainian statehood, but it has also forced the West to confront the return of geopolitical realities many believed had disappeared after 1991.

In that sense, Ukraine is not only fighting for its independence. It is forcing Europe and North America to rediscover the political will that underpins the idea of sovereignty itself.

The question now is whether Western policy will finally align with the logic of the war — or continue to trail behind events.

Hans Boserup, Dr.jur. 🇩🇰's avatar

What makes this analysis uniquely credible, Chris, is that you are not speculating from a distance. You knew Putin personally — you walked with him for two hours, without an interpreter, speaking Russian. You have seen the man up close: his bearing, his instincts, his reflexes. That direct experience gives your observation about the figure now appearing in Kremlin photo ops a weight that no amount of open-source analysis can replicate.

The person in the photograph with President Touadéra does not pass the test. And the silence you document here is, in a way, even more telling than the face. The real Putin — the one you knew — would never have let the US and Israeli strikes on Iran pass without seizing the moment for a sharp, resonant speech. His 2007 Munich address was built on exactly that instinct: to use America's military moves as a platform to define himself as the indispensable counterweight. The absence of that reflex is not caution. It is incapacity.

Your point that Russia is now 'headless, friendless and almost penniless' deserves to be read in every Western foreign ministry. The temptation in diplomatic circles is always to negotiate with whoever is sitting across the table and to paper over the question of legitimacy. But if the Kremlin's principal interlocutor is, as you argue, a stand-in who cannot make decisions and cannot even improvise credibly on the biggest story of the week, then the entire architecture of current ceasefire diplomacy rests on sand.

The Death of Stalin analogy is apt — except that in Iannucci's film, the vacuum was at least visible to the people inside the room. What makes today's situation more dangerous is that the vacuum is being actively concealed, and too many Western leaders are still pretending the room is occupied.

Thank you for continuing to say what others with your knowledge choose not to say.

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