(Lord Palmerston, circa 1855, by Francis Cruikshank)
Since the Congress of Vienna in 1814-15, the only allied leader who enduringly rolled back Russia’s imperial ambitions in Europe was Palmerston.
Neocons may howl at this claim. They believe the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union was caused by Reagan’s programme of rearmament, support for Afghan mujahidin, and countering of Soviet active measures.
The reality is that arming Afghan proxies was Brzezinski’s policy (under Carter). When Reagan’s team left office in 1989, the Berlin wall was still standing. They had little inkling the USSR was about to collapse. Bush and later presidents took no effective steps to prevent Russia from reasserting control over former territories — except in the Baltic states, which were admitted to the EU and NATO.
By ‘rolling back’ Russian imperial ambitions, I mean deliberate action, with enduring results, to deter or defeat Russian aggression. By this definition, the unsuccessful allied intervention in the Russian civil war (1918-20) — championed by Churchill, Wilson, Masaryk, Borden and others — does not make the cut. To keep this analysis clear and simple, let’s divide Russia’s major defeats since 1812 into three main categories, in ascending order of scale and permanence.
The first includes Russia’s two massive but ephemeral defeats. One was losing to Germany and Austro-Hungary, which pushed Moscow out of the First World War and into the hands of Bolsheviks who signed the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The other was the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-89), which unleashed centrifugal forces in the Warsaw Pact and USSR. Both were major setbacks that did not last, as in each case Russia rapidly rebuilt influence across much of its former empire.
The second category embraces Russia’s defeats in ‘single combat’ against one country. This list features the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), the Polish-Soviet War (1919-21), the Russo-Finnish Winter War (1939-40) and the First Chechen War (1994-96). In each case, the ‘single combatant,’ while victorious, did not prevent Russia’s revenge. As an ally of Nazi Germany, Stalin invaded Poland in 1939. He occupied Japan’s Northern Territories in 1945. ‘Finlandization’ lasted for decades. Putin brutally re-subjugated the Caucasus in the Second Chechen War (1999-2009).
The third category is direct allied military action resulting in Russian defeat, with enduring outcomes. There is (so far) only one such case — the Crimean War (1853-56), where Turkey, France, the UK and Sardinia inflicted a decisive defeat on Russia on its own territory. As a consequence, Russia lost control of the Black Sea, was deprived of a Black Sea fleet, and (despite relapses under Alexander II, Nicholas II and Stalin) dropped its previous ambition of expanding into the Balkans or Turkey. The main architect of this victory was Henry John Temple, Third Viscount Palmerston, who was Home Secretary when the war began and Prime Minister of the United Kingdom starting on February 6th, 1855. His nickname was Pam.
Pam believed in promoting the independence of nations previously incorporated by conquest into the Russian empire. In 1832, he circulated a memorandum on European security to ministers arguing that: “The best and most effectual security for the future Peace of Europe would be the severance from Russia of some of the frontier territories acquired by her in later Times, Georgia, Circassia, the Crimea, Bessarabia, Poland & Finland.” These were the ‘single combatants’ mentioned above. Half are currently free, though Bessarabia, now Moldova, faces a big test in four days. Others may slip free of Moscow’s bondage if Ukraine and allies prevail against Russia’s current invasion.
Palmerston was convinced Russia would desist from such aggression only when it met an insuperable obstacle. In 1836 he wrote in a private letter to Lord Granville that: “The policy and practice of the Russian Government has always been to push forward its encroachments as fast and as far as the apathy or want of firmness of other Governments would allow it to go, but always to stop and retire when it met with decided resistance and then to wait for the next favorable opportunity.”
In other words, Moscow would advance in the face of weakness but retire when it met strength. For Palmerston, war was a last resort but infinitely preferable to acquiescence in Russia’s reckless, unending expansion. As the Crimean war opened, he told parliament that: “Peace is an Excellent Thing, and War is a great Misfortune. But there are Many things More valuable than Peace, and many Things Much worse than war. The maintenance of the Ottoman Empire belongs to the First Class, the Occupation of Turkey by Russia belongs to the Second.”
Ukraine’s President Zelenskyy, known as Ze, and other Ukrainian leaders have been making virtually identical arguments since Russia first invaded in 2014. Yesterday the President of the United States seemed to be channeling this thinking as he wrote: “I think Ukraine (…) is in a position to fight and WIN all of Ukraine back in its original form. With time, patience, and the financial support of Europe and, in particular, NATO, the original Borders from where this War started, is very much an option. Why not? Russia has been fighting aimlessly for three and a half years a War that should have taken a Real Military Power less than a week to win. This is not distinguishing Russia. In fact, it is very much making them look like ‘a paper tiger.’ (…) Ukraine (…) has Great Spirit, and only getting better, Ukraine would be able to take back their Country in its original form and, who knows, maybe even go further than that! Putin and Russia are in BIG Economic trouble, and this is the time for Ukraine to act.”
Those are fighting words, worthy of both Palmerston and Zelenskyy. Has Trump, against all odds, adopted a policy of decided resistance? I very much doubt it. He probably just wants to be on the winning side. Indeed, by defeating Russia’s invasion to date, Ukraine has given allies their best prospect of throwing back Russian aggression, with truly strategic results, since Palmerston, whose siege and capture of Sevastopol stalled Russia’s war machine for decades.
After defeat in Crimea, Russia returned to the path of imperial expansion in Europe and Asia only thanks to alliances with France, Germany and later Britain itself. Moscow’s current isolation — even China’s backing is half-hearted — is without precedent. The door is open for decisive action. An enduring triumph by Zelenskyy’s Ukraine — one that ‘won all of Ukraine back’ while securing Moldova and freeing Belarus and Georgia — would surpass even Palmerston’s feat. With deliberate allied support, Ze can win a Pam-style victory today.