What I’m afraid of is that the US & Israel will fail to dislodge the regime. They’re really dug in, with big, well-armed paramilitaries. The citizens aren’t armed at all.
I tend to agree with your concern. That’s why Trump is hoping to do enough mob hits until he gets a mobster he can negotiate with. I think that’s a misread of the theocratic nature of Iran.
Yes. And to be fair, the Pentagon planners whose job this is are probably aware of this also, so all we can do here is speculate. That said, even a mission that defangs the regime and does not topple it (yet), can still be considered better than the alternative, which is enhanced defense cooperation between China and Iran which was starting to happen.
I don’t think it’s accurate to say the objectives are unclear. They’re not clearly stated to the public which has been upsetting for Congress (authority usurped), and for most (not all) Democrats. That doesn’t mean that the objectives are unclear to Bibi, Trump, or the people around Trump that successfully lobbied him for this war. I don’t think this idea originated with Trump in any case. 3 confluences here:
1. State and Nat Sec Advisor combined in Rubio
2. Hegseth’s 12 century tattoo
3. Trump’s son-in-law’s longstanding goals viz a viz Israel and the Middle East.
4. Iran tried to murder Trump at least once before making him more sway-able on this one perhaps
Aka: there was a lot of energy behind this from a lot of different directions.
Tulsi has been long-ago relegated to the C team, hence the need for Rubio to play Cardinal Richelieu in this drama.
Now you throw in deepening of technical military ties between Iran, Russia and China and you start to see that there’s a window here for getting this done among the Pentagon planners AND IDF planners. I’m not party to private conversations but they almost certainly independently reached similar conclusions and unlike the Gulf War felt 0 need to bring the public in on this one. In their minds, it’s impossible to explain this level of complexity to the US public in any case: so why bother other than the “they were going for nukes” standard explanation.
In the case of the US, the biggest risk as always is China and restricting China’s ability to wage war on the US and our first island chain allies in the future. For IDF Chinese technical support of Iran becomes potentially existential: interests aligned here.
Also, Trump’s political operating system is extremely simple: announce objectives after success, not before. In a high-risk operation, that prevents the possibility of visible failure which matters to him as a politician and as a narcissist. If you declare the objective beforehand and fall short, you lose. If you wait and define the objective after the fact, every outcome can be reframed as success.
From that perspective, the ambiguity we’re seeing is not necessarily confusion, it’s risk management, tailored to Trump’s personality and political instincts.
At the strategic level, however, the direction seems fairly obvious. Whatever language is used publicly, this is functionally a regime-change war. The real question is what kind of regime change emerges, if any.
The cheapest outcome for Trump would be an internal deal within the existing 2nd tier Iranian elite; something like the Venezuelan scenario, where elements of the ruling structure cut a bargain with Washington and stabilize the situation. That would allow him to declare victory quickly and avoid a long occupation or nation-building project.
I think that’s unlikely and so plan B will be provoking an uprising by arming Kurds, Baluchis etc. Or maybe threatening to do so in order to achieve plan A by scaring the new leaders into negotiating.
Trump’s attempting a surgical regime modification as the lowest cost, highest ROI way to defang Iran and move them out of Russian and Chinese orbit. I can’t say whether or not it’s going to work but it is too soon to say that there is no plan and that the Pentagon has not learned from Iraq. I mean, the Pentagon has not come across as particularly incompetent of late, let’s be honest.
The biggest risk I see now is a strategically shallow outcome. If the long-term objective is to pull Iran away from Russia and China and gradually reintegrate it into the Western system, then a simple elite reshuffle inside the current power structure might not actually accomplish that. Then again, even that kind of failure preserves option value for later, so if it does not work, you can come back in 12 months and have another crack at it.
Thanks for your very helpful and stimulating thoughts above, Simon! I will write more on these subjects in a post later today. In the meantime, let's recall the history of US war aims. In the Second World War, when communications were hardly instaneous, the main agreements about war aims that came out of Placentia Bay, Quebec, Casablanca, Tehran, Yalta and other conferences were either conveyed the same day or one or two days later. The same was more or less true in Korea, Vietnam (with the exception of the bombing campaign in Cambodia), Afghanistan and Iraq. So I very much doubt that Trump, Bibi or others have defined war aims beyond those publicly expressed. They may had private hopes, fed by intelligence work, of opening a split in the regime, but the would-be coup plotters seem to have been liquidated. Let's be honest: Trump has been all over the map on objectives. His model for success is Venezuela -- just as George W. Bush's model for success in Iraq was Afghanistan in 2001-02. But we both know this campaign, however it plays out, will be both very different and far more complicated than the Venezuela operation. Calling these conflicting signals risk management is far too charitable. It's confusion. The war aims have not been well-defined, and they will continue to evolve. You (and Marin Wolf in today's FT) see a deal with second tier Iranian regime officials as the best possible outcome. That requires them to be strong to defy the first tier -- or for the first tier to be totally eliminated -- not impossible but once again, a tall order.Another scenario you foresee is an uprising by Kurds, etc -- the Shah's son seems to be pitching this and Turkey would probably become it as well. But that kind of proxy action requires patient preparation and logistical support, which is not in place so far as I can make out. 'Defanging Iran' -- that is, degrading its air, drone, missile and naval capabilities -- strikes me as the most achievable goal. But removing them from the orbit of China and Russia seems to me a much less likely outcome, especially when both Bibi and Trump are very much, in their respective ways, in Russia's orbit. The only lesson the Pentagon seems to have learned from Iraq is not to do 'moralizing' or 'nation-building'. Unfortunately, this basically means they (particularly Hegseth) do not care a jot about the kind of regime that emerges in Iran -- so long as it does not attack Israel, the US or their Gulf allies. This will eventually be discouraging and uninspiring for Iranians who are already running enormous risks to defend the limited rights they have. As Frau Katze notes below, the regime is "really dug in". History shows such adversaries are rarely, if ever, defeated by air power alone. I hope this time is different, but experience tells me it probably will not be. We all have to keep in mind that Iran started this war by attacking Israel through its proxy Hamas on October 7th, 2023. That aggression was encouraged for obvious reasons by Moscow. Israel won the first phase of the war -- virtually on its own -- against the axis of resistance in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and elsewhere. This second phase of the war is really about curtailing Iran's military capabilities. Can it bring regime change? It's still too soon to say for sure. Regime change cam to Syria precisely when it was not under attack. I agree with you that many forces were pushing Trump to act: they have been pushing Washington to grasp the Iranian nettle for years, even decades. I'm well aware of this. But it's also slightly disingenuous to ascribe to Trump the high-minded goals articulated by these voices. As you and I both know, this operation would not be happening if Israel were not already well into its third year of high-intensity military operations against Iran and its proxies. The strategic initiative has been Israel's; the current US Administration has merely joined this mission on a larger scale than it did last year. Why did Trump join the wider campaign this time? You give some ancillary reasons above. A key enabler for his decision was, in my view, his perception that the Venezuela operation had gone flawlessly and been a success. A second was that his party is very low in the polls in an election year, and successful US military operations have in the past produced halo effects for incumbents. George W. Bush may have won his second term because of perceived success in Afghanistan. So 'wag the dog' is a big factor here too. Thanks again for the exchange! Keep up your fantastic work, please.
What I’m afraid of is that the US & Israel will fail to dislodge the regime. They’re really dug in, with big, well-armed paramilitaries. The citizens aren’t armed at all.
I tend to agree with your concern. That’s why Trump is hoping to do enough mob hits until he gets a mobster he can negotiate with. I think that’s a misread of the theocratic nature of Iran.
I think so too. They’re religious fanatics, not the more typical autocrats of Venezuela.
But even in Venezuela, there’s population as a whole has seen little benefit from taking Maduro out.
Yes. And to be fair, the Pentagon planners whose job this is are probably aware of this also, so all we can do here is speculate. That said, even a mission that defangs the regime and does not topple it (yet), can still be considered better than the alternative, which is enhanced defense cooperation between China and Iran which was starting to happen.
I’m certainly hoping for the best. The Israelis have been very effective at going after Hezbollah. Hoping they’ve got plans for the regime.
I don’t think it’s accurate to say the objectives are unclear. They’re not clearly stated to the public which has been upsetting for Congress (authority usurped), and for most (not all) Democrats. That doesn’t mean that the objectives are unclear to Bibi, Trump, or the people around Trump that successfully lobbied him for this war. I don’t think this idea originated with Trump in any case. 3 confluences here:
1. State and Nat Sec Advisor combined in Rubio
2. Hegseth’s 12 century tattoo
3. Trump’s son-in-law’s longstanding goals viz a viz Israel and the Middle East.
4. Iran tried to murder Trump at least once before making him more sway-able on this one perhaps
Aka: there was a lot of energy behind this from a lot of different directions.
Tulsi has been long-ago relegated to the C team, hence the need for Rubio to play Cardinal Richelieu in this drama.
Now you throw in deepening of technical military ties between Iran, Russia and China and you start to see that there’s a window here for getting this done among the Pentagon planners AND IDF planners. I’m not party to private conversations but they almost certainly independently reached similar conclusions and unlike the Gulf War felt 0 need to bring the public in on this one. In their minds, it’s impossible to explain this level of complexity to the US public in any case: so why bother other than the “they were going for nukes” standard explanation.
In the case of the US, the biggest risk as always is China and restricting China’s ability to wage war on the US and our first island chain allies in the future. For IDF Chinese technical support of Iran becomes potentially existential: interests aligned here.
Also, Trump’s political operating system is extremely simple: announce objectives after success, not before. In a high-risk operation, that prevents the possibility of visible failure which matters to him as a politician and as a narcissist. If you declare the objective beforehand and fall short, you lose. If you wait and define the objective after the fact, every outcome can be reframed as success.
From that perspective, the ambiguity we’re seeing is not necessarily confusion, it’s risk management, tailored to Trump’s personality and political instincts.
At the strategic level, however, the direction seems fairly obvious. Whatever language is used publicly, this is functionally a regime-change war. The real question is what kind of regime change emerges, if any.
The cheapest outcome for Trump would be an internal deal within the existing 2nd tier Iranian elite; something like the Venezuelan scenario, where elements of the ruling structure cut a bargain with Washington and stabilize the situation. That would allow him to declare victory quickly and avoid a long occupation or nation-building project.
I think that’s unlikely and so plan B will be provoking an uprising by arming Kurds, Baluchis etc. Or maybe threatening to do so in order to achieve plan A by scaring the new leaders into negotiating.
Trump’s attempting a surgical regime modification as the lowest cost, highest ROI way to defang Iran and move them out of Russian and Chinese orbit. I can’t say whether or not it’s going to work but it is too soon to say that there is no plan and that the Pentagon has not learned from Iraq. I mean, the Pentagon has not come across as particularly incompetent of late, let’s be honest.
The biggest risk I see now is a strategically shallow outcome. If the long-term objective is to pull Iran away from Russia and China and gradually reintegrate it into the Western system, then a simple elite reshuffle inside the current power structure might not actually accomplish that. Then again, even that kind of failure preserves option value for later, so if it does not work, you can come back in 12 months and have another crack at it.
Thanks for your very helpful and stimulating thoughts above, Simon! I will write more on these subjects in a post later today. In the meantime, let's recall the history of US war aims. In the Second World War, when communications were hardly instaneous, the main agreements about war aims that came out of Placentia Bay, Quebec, Casablanca, Tehran, Yalta and other conferences were either conveyed the same day or one or two days later. The same was more or less true in Korea, Vietnam (with the exception of the bombing campaign in Cambodia), Afghanistan and Iraq. So I very much doubt that Trump, Bibi or others have defined war aims beyond those publicly expressed. They may had private hopes, fed by intelligence work, of opening a split in the regime, but the would-be coup plotters seem to have been liquidated. Let's be honest: Trump has been all over the map on objectives. His model for success is Venezuela -- just as George W. Bush's model for success in Iraq was Afghanistan in 2001-02. But we both know this campaign, however it plays out, will be both very different and far more complicated than the Venezuela operation. Calling these conflicting signals risk management is far too charitable. It's confusion. The war aims have not been well-defined, and they will continue to evolve. You (and Marin Wolf in today's FT) see a deal with second tier Iranian regime officials as the best possible outcome. That requires them to be strong to defy the first tier -- or for the first tier to be totally eliminated -- not impossible but once again, a tall order.Another scenario you foresee is an uprising by Kurds, etc -- the Shah's son seems to be pitching this and Turkey would probably become it as well. But that kind of proxy action requires patient preparation and logistical support, which is not in place so far as I can make out. 'Defanging Iran' -- that is, degrading its air, drone, missile and naval capabilities -- strikes me as the most achievable goal. But removing them from the orbit of China and Russia seems to me a much less likely outcome, especially when both Bibi and Trump are very much, in their respective ways, in Russia's orbit. The only lesson the Pentagon seems to have learned from Iraq is not to do 'moralizing' or 'nation-building'. Unfortunately, this basically means they (particularly Hegseth) do not care a jot about the kind of regime that emerges in Iran -- so long as it does not attack Israel, the US or their Gulf allies. This will eventually be discouraging and uninspiring for Iranians who are already running enormous risks to defend the limited rights they have. As Frau Katze notes below, the regime is "really dug in". History shows such adversaries are rarely, if ever, defeated by air power alone. I hope this time is different, but experience tells me it probably will not be. We all have to keep in mind that Iran started this war by attacking Israel through its proxy Hamas on October 7th, 2023. That aggression was encouraged for obvious reasons by Moscow. Israel won the first phase of the war -- virtually on its own -- against the axis of resistance in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and elsewhere. This second phase of the war is really about curtailing Iran's military capabilities. Can it bring regime change? It's still too soon to say for sure. Regime change cam to Syria precisely when it was not under attack. I agree with you that many forces were pushing Trump to act: they have been pushing Washington to grasp the Iranian nettle for years, even decades. I'm well aware of this. But it's also slightly disingenuous to ascribe to Trump the high-minded goals articulated by these voices. As you and I both know, this operation would not be happening if Israel were not already well into its third year of high-intensity military operations against Iran and its proxies. The strategic initiative has been Israel's; the current US Administration has merely joined this mission on a larger scale than it did last year. Why did Trump join the wider campaign this time? You give some ancillary reasons above. A key enabler for his decision was, in my view, his perception that the Venezuela operation had gone flawlessly and been a success. A second was that his party is very low in the polls in an election year, and successful US military operations have in the past produced halo effects for incumbents. George W. Bush may have won his second term because of perceived success in Afghanistan. So 'wag the dog' is a big factor here too. Thanks again for the exchange! Keep up your fantastic work, please.